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EVUE DES LIVRES
Criminal Law. By J. C. SmiTH and BRiAN HOGAN. London:. Butter-
worth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. 1965 . Pp . ixxix, 609. ($17-50)
In the ensuing paragraphs, I intend to discuss English teaching
materials in general rather than the particular merits of this book.
A short examination of the text shows that the authors, who are
two of the most capable commentators in the field, have a firm
grasp of their subject and have provided an excellent guide to the
black-letter law. I am fully aware of the excellent work done by
Professor Smith in helping readers understand the cases reported
in the Criminal Law Review and the imaginative editing carried out
by Mr. Hoganin his capacity as an editor of Medicine Science and
the Law and, more recently, of the Criminal Law Review. My
criticism stems from the very fact that the authors should feel that
there is a pedagogical justification for a new criminal law text book
in this format. In the Preface, they explain that it will fill a gap
between the old student standby, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal
Law' and Glanville William's analytical and exhaustive Criminal
Law : The General Part .' This is probably an accurate assessment
of the present state of English legal education and teaching mater-
ials . If so, it is an unfortunate state of affairs. The authors also
declare in the Preface that they "have endeavoured to provide the
undergraduate with as complete an exposition of the substantive
Criminal Law as he has to guide him in other fields of study" .
They have excluded procedure unless its discussion was necessi-
tated by the discussion of criminal law. Evidence, "now commonly
regarded as a worthy subject of academic study in its own right",
is similarly avoided by the authors. They seem to have achieved
their purposes in stating the substantive law if the fifty-six pages3
containing tables of statutes and cases is any guide. In addition
to this vast use of bibliographical material, the text of the book
covers almost six hundred pages. How is space used? The print is
small and the footnotes are of a terse, bibliographical nature, at
least compared with those in American,texts . Even on the author's
own terms, I find the relative weight given to topics a little per-
'(18ih ed., by Turner, 1962).
2 (2nd ed ., 1961).
	
3 Pp. xxiii to lxxix.
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plexJ.ng . For instance, only ten pages are assigned to a very cursory
examination of "The Aims of the Criminal Law". This topic has
been the subject of frequent and illuminating study in recent years . 4
These discussions emanated from a dissatisfaction with the narrow
view of criminal law which the book under review is perpetuating.
This new approach gives consideration to "the nature of the litnita-
tions imposed upon the use of the criminal law for attaining its
primary purpose of pervading values and principles of the general
democratic social order in which it functions".'
The criminal law has been re-examined with a view to a planned
use of the law to achieve social ends . The "doctrinal apparatus" of
the relevant law must be perfected and this could only be done by
relating it to other social processes . The drafting of the Model
Penal Code was predicated on the assumption that the substantive
criminal law was chaotic, encrusted with legal anachronisms and
took little account of anything outside the narrow, and confining
concepts of mens rea, actus reus, possession, "taking", "malice
aforethought", and so on . The task of the American Law Institute
did not end with a re-organization and rationalisation of the case
law. The Chief Reporter of the Model Penal Code, Professor
Herbert Wechsler, makes this very clear when he says :
. . . we shift our focus from the courts and their decisions to the legis-
latures and the task of legislation ; and we concern ourselves with our
subject as we think it should be viewed by those with ultimate respon-
sibility for making law, not merely the subordinate responsibility for its
interpretation or its application . . . .
A shift of this kind in our focus or perspective, works enormous
change in our pre-occupations . For, our interest moves at once from
the peripheral issues that give the largest trouble to the courts, working
within existing systems, to the basic and intrinsic problems of the field,
the questions as to ends and means that ought to be confronted in the
building or appraisal or improvement of a system geared to serve its
proper functions in the government of men. The target necessarily
becomes to order all the problems in their right relation to each other ;
to explore their possible solutions, estimating, in so far as possible,
both their advantages and cost ; to marshal, articulate, and weigh
values, knowledge, judgment, and experience that bear upon the
choices to be made .
To say this is not to say that it is unimportant that we know and
understand existing laws .6
I E.g. Williams, The Proper Scope and Function of the Criminal Law
(1958), 74 L.Q . Re v . 76 ; Michael and Wechsler . Criminal Law and Its Ad-
ministration (1940), pp . 4-20, Cohen, Moral Aspects ofthe Criminal LaW.
(1940),49 Yale L.J . 987 ;Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1959) ; H.L~A .
Hart, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility (1962) ; Allen,
The Borderland of Criminal Justice (1964) ; Mewett, The Proper Scope
and Function of the Criminal Law (1961), 3 Crim . L.Q. 371 .
Paulsen and Kadish : Criminal Law and Its Processes (1962), p . 3 .
Wechsler . Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law (1957) . 9 J . Leg~ U.
18, at p . 20 .
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The authors also discuss punishment in the most pedestrian
way, dividing the various "theories" into nicely separated cate-
gories without establishing their relationship to the underlying
policy of the criminal law or the implications of penology. This
section is altogether too thin . Why not quote from some of the
more thoughtful works of recent years on the inter-relationships of
crime, corrections and sentencing?7
Similarly, Chapter 2 which discusses "The Definition of a
Crime" is equally shallow, skimming across the surface of the
subject ensuring that English law students will never get their
feet wet.
Let me repeat that the authors are, of course, victims of a
system rather than creators of it . My major problem in reading the
text is that I find the orientation to be diametrically opposed to the
approach which I think a law student should be encouraged to take.
In Chapter 5 on Negligence, for instance, there is a three-page
statement which is of limited value as it tries to state in a short
space what should be developed in a more general discussion of
responsibility. Admittedly the authors discuss negligence in rela-
tion to manslaughter" but here their approach is to give chapter
and verse of the cases in the text and to use one or two sentences
to describe (with footnote citation) the arguments of men such as
H. L. A. Hart, Glanville Williams and Jerome Hall who have
thought deeply on the subject and have points of view which
deserve elaboration and exposure to students .
What is the pedagogical aim of the English law teacher? Is he
simply content with turning out successful LL.B . candidates who
have temporary knowledge of literally thousands of cases illustrat
ing some questionable principles? Alternatively, is he hoping to
mould the mind of his law student, who is a potential legislator,
law reformer as well as lawyer, so that he will take a constructively
critical view of his laws so that he can improve them rather than
blindly follow or glibly distinguish them in a legalistic manner?
I submit that law teachers who believe that we should cram the
students' heads with black-letter law in the vague hope that the
students will give some later thought to "policy", the rationale of
these laws, and so on, have the cart before the horse. How can one
possibly be in a position to assess the efficacy of the present crim-
inal law when one is so preoccupied with the more sophisticated
absurdities of mens rea? While on this point, I must applaud
Messrs. Smith and Hogan for not succumbing to the temptation of
devoting numerous pages to the discussion of impossibility in
attempt . They limit this topic (and related problems) to a mere ten
pages.9 Coincidentally, this is precisely the space devoted to the
7 E.g. Crime and Corrections (1958), 23 Law & Contemporary Prob-
lems 583 . 8 Pp . 223-229 . 11 Pp . 152-161 .
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problem of insanity as a defence in the criminal law (including
unfitness to plead) . A further four pages describe the defence of
diminished responsibility. In the discussion, the word "psychia-
trist" is never used although one half page discusses "Proposals
for Reform"." In this section the critics of the M'Naghten Rules"
are cited as believing that the Rules are based on "outdated psycho-
logical views".12 The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment of
1953 is also referred to ; the commissioners "thought that the
question of responsibility is not primarily a matter of law or of
medicine, but of morals and, therefore, most appropriately decided
by a jury of ordinary men and women"." While law students must
understand that the insanity defence is subject to definition by law,
surely they should have some inkling of the psychiatrist's viewpoint .
Unlike many sections of the book, the discussion of insanity cites
only one inconsequential law review article and no learned treat-
ises . I also find it very surprising that the DU1.11aM14 rule is not
mentioned . No one suggests that the rule laid down by the Federal
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is perfect but it was
the first serious judicial effort to provide an alternative to the
M'Naghten Rule . Canadian readers will also be disappointed to
find no reference to the excellent AfeRuer Report. 15
Drunkenness, as it is commented upon in this book," is an-
other area where the English law teacher is missing an excellent
opportunity to discuss the implications of the current views on
responsibility. The discussion is narrowly based on the leading
cases of Meade" and Beard."' I am not suggesting that a text book
on criminal law should include an exposition on the Jellinek
studies of alcoholism" or the psycho-social aspects of the problem ;
it should, however, stimulate a questioning attitude toward the
present state of the defence, as well as a reassessment, in the con-
text of drunkenness, of mens rea and the so-called presumption of
intention. In this context, the omission of Stones,10 Hornbuckle,"
George22 and Boucher 2s robs the discussion of a viability which these
cases, particularly the first named, would have provided.
There is a singular lack of Commonwealth or United States
materials. Why this parochial view? Outside the discussion of a
few areas peculiar to the Commonwealth (such as excessive self-
defence), few Australian or Canadian sources are cited. Why are
10 Pp . 107-108.
'I Daniel M'Naghten's Case (1843), 10 Cf . & Fin. 200.
12 P. 107. 13 Pp . 107-108.
14 Durham v. United States (1954), 214 F. 2d 862, 45 A.L.R . 2d 1430,
11, Report of the Royal Commission on the Law of Insanity as a De-
fence in Criminal Cases (1956) .
"I Pp . 116-120. 17 [1909] 1 K.B . 895. is [1920] A.C . 479.
19 For instance, Haggard and Jellinek, Alcohol Explored (1942).
20 (1955), 56 S.R . (N.S.W.) 25 .
*1 [1945] V.L.R . 281. 22 [19601 S.C.R . 871. 2'(1962). 39 C.R . 242.
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Proudman v. Dayman24 and O'Grady v. SparlingN ignored? In a
discussion of necessity why should students not be invited to
consider the Case of the Speluncean Explorers?26
What then is such a book as the one under review trying to
achieve? I am frankly mystified. The comments I have made above
make it perfectly clear that this is not meant to be a book which
will stimulate the student to broaden his perspective of the pheno-
menon we call "crime". If this were so, we would find, for instance,
greater attention paid to the theory of punishment, the concept of
crime and criminal law, and to take particular examples, the
rationale of conspiracy,27 or the socio-economic aspects of property
offences . This last omission is one of the most glaring. Surely Hall's
Theft, Lawand SoCiety28 is one of the most important contributions
to this area of law (not sociology, economics, or psychology).
Similarly, how could one ignore criminal or quasi-criminal "busi-
ness practices", such as those which relate to white-collar crime,
price-fixing, anti-trust or the duties and liabilities of company
directors.
If the English law teacher is not planning to educate (in its
purest sense) in the law, what is he aiming at, as exemplified by
the law stated in this book? Is he planning to train the student to
be a practitioner in the criminal courts? Presumingfor the moment
that such an aim is capable of achievement, which is doubtful, do
the contents of this book, the substantive law "stated as at April
30, 1965", help him in this task? Canhe, for instance, justify amere
twenty pages devoted to actus reus and mens rea, the very bases
of criminal law, while more than four times that space is devoted
to the atypical and relatively uncommon crimes of homicide?
The approach of this book is such that a student will complete
his study with a super-saturated knowledge of the intricacies of the
law relating to property offences (amounting to one quarter of the
entire book) with all its legalistic warts. The student will, however,
have no idea what will happen to a client who is illegally arrested,
illegally searched, subjected to procedures which test his sobriety,
whose communications are subjected to eavesdropping, who con-
fesses under coercion, who wishes to be released on bail, to
impugn evidence (on the basis of its relevancy to the rules of
substantive law or otherwise) or to appeal . The student will have
no knowledge of the operation of the legal aid system . The student
will also be ignorant of the sentencing process, the use of pre-
sentence investigations, the types of punishments which may be
24 (1941), 67 C.L.R . 536 . 25 (19601 S.C.R . 804 .
26 Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers (1949), 62 Harv. L .
Rev . 6 1 .
27 Cf. the cursory discussion at p . 144 of the implications of Shaw v~
D.P.P.J1962] A.C . 220.
28 (2nd ed., 1952).
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imposed on the potential client . These matters could not, of course,
be dealt with at length or in depth, but they deserve attention if the
student is to be something more than a mere repository of narrow
legal rules laid down by a positivistic judicial system and which are
divorced from the disciplines which have a kindred interest in the
community problem of crime and the treatment of the criminal as
a deviate from the norms of society .
If the English teacher of criminal law does not intend to achieve
these ends, an intensive study of the rules of the criminal law are
likely to rob the law student of the greatest attractions of this field
of law. The resulting course in substantive criminal law will be
something less than a stimulating intellectual experience.
I cannot help comparing this type of book with the casebooks
compiled in the United States . The most radical casebook is that
of Goldstein, Donnelly and SchwartZ29 ; a short perusal of its
table of contents wili convince the reader of the truth of this state-
ment . The editors discuss very little "substantive" law but examine
the problems of criminai law and punishment from the viewpoint
of a few illustrative cases. Such an approach would no doubt be
too extreme for ail but a select body of students in the rarified
atmosphere of the Yale Law School or some similar institution .
Paulsen and Kadish, Criminal Law and Its ProcessesIO provides
a more moderate teaching tool. This book embodies the best
combination of theory and practice, policy and black-letter law,
of ambiguous issues and pragmatic solutions .
I intend no disrespect to Messrs . Smith and Hogan when I
suggest thm a collection of the best academic writing, governmen-
tal and commission reports, perceptive and well-reasoned judg-
ments, garnished with stimulating editorial comment and ques-
tions provides the best "text" book for the law student. I do not
believe it is absolutely necessary, although no doubt desirable, for
such a book to be used under the case method of teaching. It
provides tools which are not available (or in short supply) in most
law libraries and places before the student rules, concepts and
arguments which he would not otherwise bother to consider or
pursue .
GRAHAm E. PARKER *
"I Criminal Law: Problems for decision in the promulgation, invoca-
tion and administration of a law of crimes (1962) . Professor Schwartz is a
sociologist.
40 See footnote 5, supra. See also Book Review (1964), 42 Can . Bar
Rev . 350 .
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